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because of their being too many； whilst from the nobles he can secure
himself； as they are few in number。 The worst that a prince may expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them； but from hostile
nobles he has not only to fear abandonment； but also that they will rise
against him； for they； being in these affairs more far…seeing and
astute； always e forward in time to save themselves； and to obtain
favours from him whom they expect to prevail。 Further； the prince is
pelled to live always with the same people； but he can do well
without the same nobles； being able to make and unmake them daily； and
to give or take away authority when it pleases him。
Therefore； to make this point clearer； I say that the nobles ought to be
looked at mainly in two ways： that is to say； they either shape their
course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune； or they do
not。 Those who so bind themselves； and are not rapacious； ought to be
honoured and loved； those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with
in two ways； they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
natural want of courage； in which case you ought to make use of them；
especially of those who are of good counsel； and thus； whilst in
prosperity you honour yourself； in adversity you have not to fear them。
But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves； it
is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you；
and a prince ought to guard against such； and to fear them as if they
were open enemies； because in adversity they always help to ruin him。
Therefore； one who bees a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly； and this he can easily do seeing they only
ask not to be oppressed by him。 But one who； in opposition to the
people； bees a prince by the favour of the nobles； ought； above
everything； to seek to win the people over to himself； and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection。 Because men； when they
receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil； are bound more
closely to their benefactor； thus the people quickly bee more devoted
to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours；
and the prince can win their affections in many ways； but as these vary
according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules； so I omit
them； but； I repeat； it is necessary for a prince to have the people
friendly； otherwise he has no security in adversity。
Nabis； Prince of the Spartans； sustained the attack of all Greece； and
of a victorious Roman army； and against them he defended his country and
his government； and for the overing of this peril it was only
necessary for him to make himself secure against a few； but this would
not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile。 And do not let
any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 'He who builds
on the people； builds on the mud；' for this is true when a private
citizen makes a foundation there； and persuades himself that the people
will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates；
wherein he would find himself very often deceived； as happened to the
Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence。 But granted a
prince who has established himself as above； who can mand； and is a
man of courage； undismayed in adversity； who does not fail in other
qualifications； and who； by his resolution and energy； keeps the whole
people encouraged such a one will never find himself deceived in
them； and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well。
These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the
civil to the absolute order of government； for such princes either rule
personally or through magistrates。 In the latter case their government
is weaker and more insecure； because it rests entirely on the goodwill
of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy； and who； especially
in troubled times； can destroy the government with great ease； either by
intrigue or open defiance； and the prince has not the chance amid
tumults to exercise absolute authority； because the citizens and
subjects； accustomed to receive orders from magistrates； are not of a
mind to obey him amid these confusions； and there will always be in
doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust。 For such a prince
cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times； when citizens had need
of the state； because then every one agrees with him； they all promise；
and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him； but in
troubled times； when the state has need of its citizens； then he finds
but few。 And so much the more is this experiment dangerous； inasmuch as
it can only be tried once。 Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a
course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of
circumstance have need of the state and of him； and then he will always
find them faithful。
CHAPTER X
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO
BE MEASURED
IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character of
these principalities： that is； whether a prince has such power that； in
case of need； he can support himself with his own resources； or whether
he has always need of the assistance of others。 And to make this quite
clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by
their own resources who can； either by abundance of men or money； raise
a sufficient army to join battle against any one who es to attack
them； and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show
themselves against the enemy in the field； but are forced to defend
themselves by sheltering behind walls。 The first case has been
discussed； but we will speak of it again should it recur。 In the second
case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision
and fortify their towns； and not on any account to defend the country。
And whoe