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and despised; the one; his having kept sheep in Thrace; which brought
him into contempt (it being well known to all; and considered a great
indignity by every one); and the other; his having at the accession to
his dominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the
imperial seat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity
by having; through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire;
practised many cruelties; so that the whole world was moved to anger at
the meanness of his birth and to fear at his barbarity。 First Africa
rebelled; then the Senate with all the people of Rome; and all Italy
conspired against him; to which may be added his own army: this latter;
besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it; were
disgusted with his cruelties; and fearing him less when they found so
many against him; murdered him。
I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus; Macrinus; or Julian; who; being
thoroughly contemptible; were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
less degree; because; notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence; that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces; as were
the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people; it is now more
necessary to all princes; except the Turk and the Soldan; to satisfy the
people rather than the soldiers; because the people are the more
powerful。
From the above I have excepted the Turk; who always keeps round him
twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the
security and strength of the kingdom; and it is necessary that; putting
aside every consideration for the people; he should keep them his
friends。 The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the
hands of soldiers; follows again that; without regard to the people; he
must keep them his friends。 But you must note that the state of the
Soldan is unlike all other principalities; for the reason that it is
like the Christian pontificate; which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons of the old
prince not the heirs; but he who is elected to that position by those
who have authority; and the sons remain only noblemen。 And this being an
ancient custom; it cannot be called a new principality; because there
are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for
although the prince is new; the constitution of the state is old; and it
is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord。
But returning to the subject of our discourse; I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above…named emperors; and it will be recognized also how it
happened that; a number of them acting in one way and a number in
another; only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones。 Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander; being new princes; to imitate Marcus; who was
heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla; modus; and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus; they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
his footsteps。 Therefore a prince; new to the principality; cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus; nor; again; is it necessary to follow
those of Severus; but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state; and from Marcus those which are proper
and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm。
CHAPTER XX
ARE FORTRESSES; AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT;
ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?
1。 SOME princes; so as to hold securely the state; have disarmed their
subjects; others have kept their subject towns by factions; others have
fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid themselves out to
gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and
destroyed them。 And although one cannot give a final judgment on all one
of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in
which a decision has to be made; nevertheless I will speak as
prehensively as the matter of itself will admit。
2。 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them; because; by
arming them; those arms bee yours; those men who were distrusted
bee faithful; and those who were faithful are kept so; and your
subjects bee your adherents。 And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed; yet when those whom you do arm are benefited; the others can be
handled more freely; and this difference in their treatment; which they
quite understand; makes the former your dependants; and the latter;
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward; excuse you。 But when you disarm
them; you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them; either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty; and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you。 And because you cannot remain unarmed; it
follows that you turn to mercenaries; which are of the character already
shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to
defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects。 Therefore;
as I have said; a new prince in a new principality has always
distributed arms。 Histories are full of examples。 But when a prince
acquires a new state; which he adds as a province to his old one; then
it is necessary to disarm the men of that state; except those who have
been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again; with time and
opportunit