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regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own
advantage； you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode
of proceeding。 Or suppose some one remends you a man as steward； as
a man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs； and； in order to
inspire you with confidence； extols him as a prudent man who
thoroughly understands his own interest； and is so indefatigably
active that he lets slip no opportunity of advancing it； lastly；
lest you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him；
praises the good taste with which he lives； not seeking his pleasure
in money…making； or in coarse wantonness； but in the enlargement of
his knowledge； in instructive intercourse with a select circle； and
even in relieving the needy； while as to the means （which； of
course； derive all their value from the end）； he is not particular；
and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were
his own； provided only he knows that he can do so safely； and
without discovery； you would either believe that the remender was
mocking you； or that he had lost his senses。 So sharply and clearly
marked are the boundaries of morality and self…love that even the
monest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to
the one or the other。 The few remarks that follow may appear
superfluous where the truth is so plain； but at least they may serve
to give a little more distinctness to the judgement of mon sense。
The principle of happiness may； indeed； furnish maxims； but never
such as would be petent to be laws of the will； even if universal
happiness were made the object。 For since the knowledge of this
rests on mere empirical data； since every man's judgement on it
depends very much on his particular point of view； which is itself
moreover very variable； it can supply only general rules； not
universal； that is； it can give rules which on the average will most
frequently fit； but not rules which must hold good always and
necessarily； hence； no practical laws can be founded on it。 Just
because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule
and must therefore precede it； the rule can refer to nothing but
what is ＇felt＇； and therefore it refers to experience and is founded
on it； and then the variety of judgement must be endless。 This
principle； therefore； does not prescribe the same practical rules to
all rational beings； although the rules are all included under a
mon title； namely； that of happiness。 The moral law； however； is
conceived as objectively necessary； only because it holds for everyone
that has reason and will。
The maxim of self…love （prudence） only advises； the law of
morality mands。 Now there is a great difference between that
which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged。
The monest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see
what； on the principle of autonomy of the will； requires to be done；
but on supposition of heteronomy of the will； it is bard and
requires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done。 That is
to say； what duty is； is plain of itself to everyone； but what is to
bring true durable advantage； such as will extend to the whole of
one's existence； is always veiled in impenetrable obscurity； and
much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to
the ends of life； even tolerably； by making proper exceptions。 But the
moral law mands the most punctual obedience from everyone； it must；
therefore； not be so difficult to judge what it requires to be done；
that the monest unpractised understanding； even without worldly
prudence； should fail to apply it rightly。
It is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical
mand of morality； whereas it is seldom possible； and by no means so
to everyone； to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of
happiness； even with regard to a single purpose。 The reason is that in
the former case there is question only of the maxim； which must be
genuine and pure； but in the latter case there is question also of
one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object。 A
mand that everyone should try to make himself happy would be
foolish； for one never mands anyone to do what he of himself
infallibly wishes to do。 We must only mand the means； or rather
supply them； since he cannot do everything that he wishes。 But to
mand morality under the name of duty is quite rational； for； in the
first place； not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they
oppose his inclinations； and as to the means of obeying this law；
these need not in this case be taught； for in this respect whatever he
wishes to do be can do。
He who has lost at play may be vexed at himself and his folly； but
if he is conscious of having cheated at play （although he has gained
thereby）； he must despise himself as soon as he pares himself
with the moral law。 This must； therefore； be something different
from the principle of private happiness。 For a man must have a
different criterion when he is pelled to say to himself： 〃I am a
worthless fellow； though I have filled my purse〃； and when he approves
himself； and says： 〃I am a prudent man； for I have enriched my
treasure。〃
Finally； there is something further in the idea of our practical
reason； which acpanies the transgression of a moral law… namely；
its ill desert。 Now the notion of punishment； as such； cannot be
united with that of being a partaker of happiness； for although
he who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the
benevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end； yet it
must first be justified in itself as punishment； i。e。； as mere harm；
so that if it stopped there； and the person punished could get no
glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness； he must yet admit
that justice was done him； and that his reward was perfectly
suitable to his conduct。 In every punishment； as such； there must
first be justice； and this constitutes the essence of the notion。
Benevolence may； indeed； be united with it； but the man who has
deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this。
Punishment； then； is a physical evil； which