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deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this。
Punishment； then； is a physical evil； which； though it be not
connected with moral evil as a natural consequence； ought to be
connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral
legislation。 Now； if every crime； even without regarding the
physical consequence with respect to the actor； is in itself
punishable； that is； forfeits happiness （at least partially）； it is
obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this； that be
has drawn punishment on himself； thereby injuring his private
happiness （which； on the principle of self…love； must be the proper
notion of all crime）。 According to this view； the punishment would
be the reason for calling anything a crime； and justice would； on
the contrary； consist in omitting all punishment； and even
preventing that which naturally follows； for； if this were done； there
would no longer be any evil in the action； since the harm which
otherwise followed it； and on account of which alone the action was
called evil； would now be prevented。 To look； however； on all
rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a
higher power； which is to serve only to set rational creatures
striving after their final end （happiness）； this is to reduce the will
to a mechanism destructive of freedom； this is so evident that it need
not detain us。
More refined； though equally false； is the theory of those who
suppose a certain special moral sense； which sense and not reason
determines the moral law； and in consequence of which the
consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with
contentment and pleasure； that of vice； with mental dissatisfaction
and pain； thus reducing the whole to the desire of private
happiness。 Without repeating what has been said above； I will here
only remark the fallacy they fall into。 In order to imagine the
vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the
consciousness of his transgressions； they must first represent him
as in the main basis of his character； at least in some degree；
morally good； just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of
right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous。 The notion of
morality and duty must； therefore； have preceded any regard to this
satisfaction； and cannot be derived from it。 A man must first
appreciate the importance of what we call duty； the authority of the
moral law； and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives
to the person in his own eyes； in order to feel that satisfaction in
the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse
that acpanies the consciousness of its transgression。 It is；
therefore； impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction
prior to the knowledge of obligation； or to make it the basis of the
latter。 A man must be at least half honest in order even to be able to
form a conception of these feelings。 I do not deny that as the human
will is； by virtue of liberty； capable of being immediately determined
by the moral law； so frequent practice in accordance with this
principle of determination can； at least； produce subjectively a
feeling of satisfaction； on the contrary； it is a duty to establish
and to cultivate this； which alone deserves to be called properly
the moral feeling； but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it；
else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such； and thus
make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the
reason； and this； if it is not to be a flat contradiction； would
destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play
of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser。
If now we pare our formal supreme principle of pure practical
reason （that of autonomy of the will） with all previous material
principles of morality； we can exhibit them all in a table in which
all possible cases are exhausted； except the one formal principle； and
thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other
principle than that now proposed。 In fact all possible principles of
determination of the will are either merely subjective； and
therefore empirical； or are also objective and rational； and both
are either external or internal。
Practical Material Principles of Determination taken as the
Foundation of Morality； are：
SUBJECTIVE。
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Education Physical feeling
（Montaigne） （Epicurus）
The civil Moral feeling
Constitution （Hutcheson）
（Mandeville）
OBJECTIVE。
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
Perfection Will of God
（Wolf and the （Crusius and other
Stoics） theological Moralists）
Those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable
of furnishing the universal principle of morality； but those in the
lower table are based on reason （for perfection as a quality of
things； and the highest perfection conceived as substance； that is；
God； can only be thought by means of rational concepts）。 But the
former notion； namely； that of perfection； may either be taken in a
theoretic signification； and then it means nothing but the
pleteness of each thing in its own kind （transcendental）； or that
of a thing merely as a thing （metaphysical）； and with that we are
not concerned here。 But the notion of perfection in a practical
sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of
purposes。 This perfection； as a quality of man and consequently
internal； is nothing but talent and； what strengthens or pletes
this； skill。 Supreme perfection conceived as substance； that is God；
and consequently external （considered practically）； is the sufficiency
of this being for all ends。 Ends then must first be given；
relatively to which only can the notion of perfection （whether
internal in ourselves or external in God） be the determining principle
of the will。 But an end… being an object which must pr