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finished； that is to say； it has been… shown first； what it
contains； that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent
of empirical principles； and next in what it is distinguished from all
other practical principles。 With the deduction； that is； the
justification of its objective and universal validity； and the
discernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a
priori； we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the
principles of pure theoretical reason。 For these referred to objects
of possible experience； namely； to phenomena； and we could prove
that these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by
being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws；
and consequently that all possible experience must conform to these
laws。 But I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the
moral law。 For this does not concern the knowledge of the properties
of objects； which may be given to the reason from some other source；
but a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the
objects； and by which reason in a rational being has causality；
i。e。； pure reason； which can be regarded as a faculty immediately
determining the will。
Now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at
fundamental powers or faculties； for the possibility of these cannot
be understood by any means； and just as little should it be
arbitrarily invented and assumed。 Therefore； in the theoretic use of
reason； it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them。
But this expedient of adducing empirical proofs； instead of a
deduction from a priori sources of knowledge； is denied us here in
respect to the pure practical faculty of reason。 For whatever requires
to draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the
grounds of its possibility on principles of experience； and pure；
yet practical； reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such。
Further； the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we
are a priori conscious； and which is apodeictically certain； though it
be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can
be found。 Hence； the objective reality of the moral law cannot be
proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason；
whether speculative or empirically supported； and therefore； even if
we renounced its apodeictic certainty； it could not be proved a
posteriori by experience； and yet it is firmly established of itself。
But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral
principle； something else is found which was quite unexpected； namely；
that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the
deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove；
but of which speculative reason was pelled at least to assume the
possibility （in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the
unconditioned in the chain of causality； so as not to contradict
itself）… I mean the faculty of freedom。 The moral law； which itself
does not require a justification； proves not merely the possibility of
freedom； but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law
as binding on themselves。 The moral law is in fact a law of the
causality of free agents and； therefore； of the possibility of a
supersensible system of nature； just as the metaphysical law of events
in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of
nature； and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was
pelled to leave undetermined； namely； the law for a causality；
the concept of which in the latter was only negative； and therefore
for the first time gives this concept objective reality。
This sort of credential of the moral law； viz。； that it is set forth
as a principle of the deduction of freedom； which is a causality of
pure reason； is a sufficient substitute for all a priori
justification； since theoretic reason was pelled to assume at least
the possibility of freedom； in order to satisfy a want of its own。 For
the moral law proves its reality； so as even to satisfy the critique
of the speculative reason； by the fact that it adds a positive
definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively； the
possibility of which was inprehensible to speculative reason； which
yet was pelled to suppose it。 For it adds the notion of a reason
that directly determines the will （by imposing on its maxims the
condition of a universal legislative form）； and thus it is able for
the first time to give objective； though only practical； reality to
reason； which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed
speculatively with its ideas。 It thus changes the transcendent use
of reason into an immanent use （so that reason is itself； by means
of ideas； an efficient cause in the field of experience）。
The determination of the causality of beings in the world of
sense； as such； can never be unconditioned； and yet for every series
of conditions there must be something unconditioned； and therefore
there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself。 Hence；
the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found
to be a want but； as far as its possibility is concerned； an
analytic principle of pure speculative reason。 But as it is absolutely
impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this
idea； because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be
impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination
of causality； we were only able to defend our supposition that a
freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense； in so
far as it is considered in the other point of view as a noumenon；
showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as
subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena； and yet
regarding its causality as physically unconditioned； in so far as
the acting being belongs to the world of understanding； and in thus
making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason。 By
this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which
that sort of causality is attributed； b