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consideration his weal and woe； but besides this he possesses it for a
higher purpose also； namely； not only to take into consideration
what is good or evil in itself； about which only pure reason；
uninfluenced by any sensible interest； can judge； but also to
distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it
the supreme condition thereof。
In estimating what is good or evil in itself； as distinguished
from what can be so called only relatively； the following points are
to be considered。 Either a rational principle is already conceived； as
of itself the determining principle of the will； without regard to
possible objects of desire （and therefore by the more legislative form
of the maxim）； and in that case that principle is a practical a priori
law； and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself。 The law in
that case determines the will directly； the action conformed to it
is good in itself； a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is
good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all
good。 Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining
principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain；
something therefore that pleases or displeases； and the maxim of
reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter
determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination； that is；
good indirectly； i。e。； relatively to a different end to which they are
means）； and in that case these maxims can never be called laws； but
may be called rational practical precepts。 The end itself； the
pleasure that we seek； is in the latter case not a good but a welfare；
not a concept of reason； but an empirical concept of an object of
sensation； but the use of the means thereto； that is； the action； is
nevertheless called good （because rational deliberation is required
for it）； not however； good absolutely； but only relatively to our
sensuous nature； with regard to its feelings of pleasure and
displeasure； but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a
pure will； this is directed only to that in which pure reason by
itself can be practical。
This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a
critique of practical reason； namely； that the concept of good and
evil must not be determined before the moral law （of which it seems as
if it must be the foundation）； but only after it and by means of it。
In fact； even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a
pure a priori law determining the will； yet； that we may not assume
principles quite gratuitously； we must； at least at first； leave it
undecided； whether the will has merely empirical principles of
determination； or whether it has not also pure a priori principles；
for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as
decided that which is the very point in question。 Supposing that we
wished to begin with the concept of good； in order to deduce from it
the laws of the will； then this concept of an object （as a good） would
at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
principle of the will。 Now； since this concept had not any practical a
priori law for its standard； the criterion of good or evil could not
be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling
of pleasure or pain； and the use of reason could only consist in
determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with
all the sensations of my existence； and in the second place the
means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure。 Now； as
experience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of
pleasure； and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this
as a condition； it follows that the possibility of a priori
practical laws would be at once excluded； because it was imagined to
be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which； as a
good； should constitute the universal though empirical principle of
determination of the will。 But what it was necessary to inquire
first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining
principle of the will （and this could never be found anywhere but in a
pure practical law； in so far as this law prescribes to maxims
merely their form without regard to an object）。 Since； however； we
laid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by
our conceptions of good and evil； whereas without a previous law
that object could not be conceived by empirical concepts； we have
deprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving
a pure practical law。 On the other hand； if we had first
investigated the latter analytically； we should have found that it
is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral
law and makes it possible； but that； on the contrary； it is the
moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it
possible； so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely。
This remark； which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical
inquiries； is of importance。 It explains at once the occasion of all
the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle
of morals。 For they sought for an object of the will which they
could make the matter and principle of a law （which consequently could
not determine the will directly； but by means of that object
referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain； whereas they ought
first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a
priori and directly； and afterwards determine the object in accordance
with the will）。 Now； whether they placed this object of pleasure；
which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness； in
happiness； in perfection； in moral ＇feeling＇； or in the will of God；
their principle in every case implied heteronomy； and they must
inevitably e upon empirical conditions of a moral law； since
their object； which was to be the immediate principle of the will；
could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to
feeling； which is always empirical。 It is only a formal law… that
is； one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its
universal legislation as the s