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that would produce mere hypocrisy； without consistency； and it is even
dangerous to allow other motives （for instance； that of interest） even
to co…operate along with the moral law； hence nothing is left us but
to determine carefully in what way the moral law bees a motive； and
what effect this has upon the faculty of desire。 For as to the
question how a law can be directly and of itself a determining
principle of the will （which is the essence of morality）； this is； for
human reason； an insoluble problem and identical with the question：
how a free will is possible。 Therefore what we have to show a priori
is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive； but what
effect it； as such； produces （or； more correctly speaking； must
produce） on the mind。
The essential point in every determination of the will by the
moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the
moral law； not only without the co…operation of sensible impulses； but
even to the rejection of all such； and to the checking of all
inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law。 So far；
then； the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative； and
this motive can be known a priori to be such。 For all inclination
and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling； and the negative
effect produced on feeling （by the check on the inclinations） is
itself feeling； consequently； we can see a priori that the moral
law； as a determining principle of the will； must by thwarting all our
inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain； and in this
we have the first； perhaps the only； instance in which we are able
from a priori considerations to determine the relation of a
cognition （in this case of pure practical reason） to the feeling of
pleasure or displeasure。 All the inclinations together （which can be
reduced to a tolerable system； in which case their satisfaction is
called happiness） constitute self…regard （solipsismus）。 This is either
the self…love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself
（philautia）； or satisfaction with oneself （arrogantia）。 The former
is called particularly selfishness； the latter self…conceit。 Pure
practical reason only checks selfishness； looking on it as natural and
active in us even prior to the moral law； so far as to limit it to the
condition of agreement with this law； and then it is called rational
self…love。 But self…conceit reason strikes down altogether； since
all claims to self…esteem which precede agreement with the moral law
are vain and unjustifiable； for the certainty of a state of mind
that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal
worth （as we shall presently show more clearly）； and prior to this
conformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful。 Now the
propensity to self…esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral
law checks； inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality。
Therefore the moral law breaks down self…conceit。 But as this law is
something positive in itself； namely； the form of an intellectual
causality； that is； of freedom； it must be an object of respect；
for； by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations； it
weakens self…conceit； and since it even breaks down； that is；
humiliates； this conceit； it is an object of the highest respect
and； consequently； is the foundation of a positive feeling which is
not of empirical origin； but is known a priori。 Therefore respect
for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual
cause； and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori
and the necessity of which we can perceive。
In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that
presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is
by that law itself； which is the supreme condition of practical
reason； excluded from the determining principles of the will which
we have called the unconditionally good； and that the mere practical
form which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal
legislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely；
and is the basis of the maxims of a pure will； which alone is good
in every respect。 However； we find that our nature as sensible
beings is such that the matter of desire （objects of inclination；
whether of hope or fear） first presents itself to us； and our
pathologically affected self； although it is in its maxims quite unfit
for universal legislation； yet； just as if it constituted our entire
self； strives to put its pretensions forward first； and to have them
acknowledged as the first and original。 This propensity to make
ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve
as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be
called self…love； and if this pretends to be legislative as an
unconditional practical principle it may be called self…conceit。 Now
the moral law； which alone is truly objective （namely； in every
respect）； entirely excludes the influence of self…love on the
supreme practical principle； and indefinitely checks the
self…conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former
as laws。 Now whatever checks our self…conceit in our own judgement
humiliates； therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man
when he pares with it the physical propensities of his nature。
That； the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles
us in our self…consciousness； awakes respect for itself； so far as
it is itself positive and a determining principle。 Therefore the moral
law is even subjectively a cause of respect。 Now since everything that
enters into self…love belongs to inclination； and all inclination
rests on feelings； and consequently whatever checks all the feelings
together in self…love has necessarily； by this very circumstance； an
influence on feeling； hence we prehend how it is possible to
perceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling；
in that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them
the supreme practical condition； i。e。； self…love； from all
participation in the supreme legislation。 This effect is on one side
merely negative； but