按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
skill； wealth； riches） it contains means for the fulfilment of our
duty； partly； because the absence of it （e。g。； poverty） implies
temptations to transgress our duty。 But it can never be an immediate
duty to promote our happiness； still less can it be the principle of
all duty。 Now； as all determining principles of the will； except the
law of pure practical reason alone （the moral law）； are all
empirical and； therefore； as such； belong to the principle of
happiness； they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of
morality and never be incorporated with it as a condition； since
this would be to destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical
admixture with geometrical principles would destroy the certainty of
mathematical evidence； which in Plato's opinion is the most
excellent thing in mathematics； even surpassing their utility。
Instead； however； of the deduction of the supreme principle of
pure practical reason； that is； the explanation of the possibility
of such a knowledge a priori； the utmost we were able to do was to
show that if we saw the possibility of the freedom of an efficient
cause； we should also see not merely the possibility； but even the
necessity； of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational
beings； to whom we attribute freedom of causality of their will；
because both concepts are so inseparably united that we might define
practical freedom as independence of the will on anything but the
moral law。 But we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an
efficient cause； especially in the world of sense； we are fortunate if
only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its
impossibility； and are now； by the moral law which postulates it；
pelled and therefore authorized to assume it。 However； there are
still many who think that they can explain this freedom on empirical
principles； like any other physical faculty； and treat it as a
psychological property； the explanation of which only requires a
more exact study of the nature of the soul and of the motives of the
will； and not as a transcendental predicate of the causality of a
being that belongs to the world of sense （which is really the
point）。 They thus deprive us of the grand revelation which we obtain
through practical reason by means of the moral law； the revelation；
namely； of a supersensible world by the realization of the otherwise
transcendent concept of freedom； and by this deprive us also of the
moral law itself； which admits no empirical principle of
determination。 Therefore it will be necessary to add something here as
a protection against this delusion and to exhibit empiricism in its
naked superficiality。
The notion of causality as physical necessity； in opposition to
the same notion as freedom； concerns only the existence of things so
far as it is determinable in time； and； consequently； as phenomena； in
opposition to their causality as things in themselves。 Now if we
take the attributes of existence of things in time for attributes of
things in themselves （which is the mon view）； then it is impossible
to reconcile the necessity of the causal relation with freedom； they
are contradictory。 For from the former it follows that every event；
and consequently every action that takes place at a certain point of
time； is a necessary result of what existed in time preceding。 Now
as time past is no longer in my power； hence every action that I
perform must be the necessary result of certain determining grounds
which are not in my power； that is； at the moment in which I am acting
I am never free。 Nay； even if I assume that my whole existence is
independent on any foreign cause （for instance； God）； so that the
determining principles of my causality； and even of my whole
existence； were not outside myself； yet this would not in the least
transform that physical necessity into freedom。 For at every moment of
time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by
that which is not in my power； and the series of events infinite a
parte priori； which I only continue according to a pre…determined
order and could never begin of myself； would be a continuous
physical chain； and therefore my causality would never be freedom。
If； then； we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is
determined in time； we cannot except him from the law of necessity
as to all events in his existence and； consequently； as to his actions
also； for that would be to hand him over to blind chance。 Now as
this law inevitably applies to all the causality of things； so far
as their existence is determinable in time； it follows that if this
were the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of
these things in themselves； freedom must be rejected as a vain and
impossible conception。 Consequently； if we would still save it； no
other way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing； so
far as it is determinable in time； and therefore its causality；
according to the law of physical necessity； belong to appearance；
and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself。
This is certainly inevitable； if we would retain both these
contradictory concepts together； but in application； when we try to
explain their bination in one and the same action； great
difficulties present themselves which seem to render such a
bination impracticable。
When I say of a man who mits a theft that； by the law of
causality； this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes
in preceding time； then it was impossible that it could not have
happened； how then can the judgement； according to the moral law； make
any change； and suppose that it could have been omitted； because the
law says that it ought to have been omitted； that is； how can a man be
called quite free at the same moment； and with respect to the same
action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity？
Some try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his
causality are of such a kind as to agree with a parative notion
of freedom。 According to this； that is sometimes called a free effect；
the determining physical cause of which li