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supersensible order and connection； which； however； for this very
reason cannot be extended further than is necessary for pure practical
purposes。
Let me be permitted on this occasion to make one more remark；
namely； that every step that we make with pure reason； even in the
practical sphere where no attention is paid to subtle speculation；
nevertheless accords with all the material points of the Critique of
the Theoretical Reason as closely and directly as if each step had
been thought out with deliberate purpose to establish this
confirmation。 Such a thorough agreement； wholly unsought for and quite
obvious （as anyone can convince himself； if he will only carry moral
inquiries up to their principles）； between the most important
proposition of practical reason and the often seemingly too subtle and
needless remarks of the Critique of the Speculative Reason；
occasions surprise and astonishment； and confirms the maxim already
recognized and praised by others； namely； that in every scientific
inquiry we should pursue our way steadily with all possible
exactness and frankness； without caring for any objections that may be
raised from outside its sphere； but； as far as we can； to carry out
our inquiry truthfully and pletely by itself。 Frequent
observation has convinced me that； when such researches are concluded；
that which in one part of them appeared to me very questionable；
considered in relation to other extraneous doctrines； when I left this
doubtfulness out of sight for a time and only attended to the business
in hand until it was pleted； at last was unexpectedly found to
agree perfectly with what had been discovered separately without the
least regard to those doctrines； and without any partiality or
prejudice for them。 Authors would save themselves many errors and much
labour lost （because spent on a delusion） if they could only resolve
to go to work with more frankness。
BOOK II。 Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason。
CHAPTER I。 Of a Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason Generally。
Pure reason always has its dialetic； whether it is considered in its
speculative or its practical employment； for it requires the
absolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned； and
this can only be found in things in themselves。 But as all conceptions
of things in themselves must be referred to intuitions； and with us
men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never
enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as
appearances； and since the unconditioned can never be found in this
chain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and
conditions； thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of
the conditions （in other words of the unconditioned） to appearances；
there arises an inevitable illusion； as if these latter were things in
themselves （for in the absence of a warning critique they are always
regarded as such）。 This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if
it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself； when
it applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing
the unconditioned to everything conditioned。 By this； however；
reason is pelled to trace this illusion to its source； and search
how it can be removed； and this can only be done by a plete
critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason； so that
the antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic
is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could
ever have fallen； since it at last drives us to search for the key
to escape from this labyrinth； and when this key is found； it
further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of；
namely； a view into a higher and an immutable order of things； in
which we even now are； and in which we are thereby enabled by definite
precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of
reason。
It may be seen in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason how in its
speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved； and how
the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded
against。 But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off。
As pure practical reason； it likewise seeks to find the
unconditioned for the practically conditioned （which rests on
inclinations and natural wants）； and this is not as the determining
principle of the will； but even when this is given （in the moral
law） it seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure
practical reason under the name of the summum bonum。
To define this idea practically； i。e。； sufficiently for the maxims
of our rational conduct； is the business of practical wisdom； and this
again as a science is philosophy； in the sense in which the word was
understood by the ancients； with whom it meant instruction in the
conception in which the summum bonum was to be placed； and the conduct
by which it was to be obtained。 It would be well to leave this word in
its ancient signification as a doctrine of the summum bonum； so far as
reason endeavours to make this into a science。 For on the one band the
restriction annexed would suit the Greek expression （which signifies
the love of wisdom）； and yet at the same time would be sufficient to
embrace under the name of philosophy the love of science： that is to
say； of all speculative rational knowledge； so far as it is
serviceable to reason； both for that conception and also for the
practical principle determining our conduct； without letting out of
sight the main end； on account of which alone it can be called a
doctrine of practical wisdom。 On the other hand； it would be no harm
to deter the self…conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of
philosopher by holding before him in the very definition a standard of
self…estimation which would very much lower his pretensions。 For a
teacher of wisdom would mean something more than a scholar who has not
e so far as to guide himself； much less to guide others； with
certain expectation of attaining so high an end： it would mean a
master in the knowledge of wisdom； which implies more than a modest
man would claim for himself。 Thus philo