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The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar
conflict between freedom and physical necessity in the causality of
events in the world。 It was solved by showing that there is no real
contradiction when the events and even the world in which they occur
are regarded （as they ought to be） merely as appearances； since one
and the same acting being； as an appearance （even to his own inner
sense）； has a causality in the world of sense that always conforms
to the mechanism of nature； but with respect to the same events； so
far as the acting person regards himself at the same time as a
noumenon （as pure intelligence in an existence not dependent on the
condition of time）； he can contain a principle by which that causality
acting according to laws of nature is determined； but which is
itself free from all laws of nature。
It is just the same with the foregoing antinomy of pure practical
reason。 The first of the two propositions； 〃That the endeavour after
happiness produces a virtuous mind；〃 is absolutely false； but the
second； 〃That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness；〃 is
not absolutely false； but only in so far as virtue is considered as
a form of causality in the sensible world； and consequently only if
I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a
rational being； it is then only conditionally false。 But as I am not
only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a
world of the understanding； but even have in the moral law a purely
intellectual determining principle of my causality （in the sensible
world）； it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a
connection as cause with happiness （as an effect in the sensible
world） if not immediate yet mediate （viz。； through an intelligent
author of nature）； and moreover necessary； while in a system of nature
which is merely an object of the senses； this bination could
never occur except contingently and； therefore； could not suffice
for the summum bonum。
Thus； notwithstanding this seeming conflict of practical reason with
itself； the summum bonum； which is the necessary supreme end of a will
morally determined； is a true object thereof； for it is practically
possible； and the maxims of the will which as regards their matter
refer to it have objective reality； which at first was threatened by
the antinomy that appeared in the connection of morality with
happiness by a general law； but this was merely from a
misconception； because the relation between appearances was taken
for a relation of the things in themselves to these appearances。
When we find ourselves obliged to go so far； namely； to the
connection with an intelligible world； to find the possibility of
the summum bonum； which reason points out to all rational beings as
the goal of all their moral wishes； it must seem strange that；
nevertheless； the philosophers both of ancient and modern times have
been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue even in
this life （in the sensible world）； or have persuaded themselves that
they were conscious thereof。 For Epicurus as well as the Stoics
extolled above everything the happiness that springs from the
consciousness of living virtuously； and the former was not so base
in his practical precepts as one might infer from the principles of
his theory； which he used for explanation and not for action； or as
they were interpreted by many who were misled by his using the term
pleasure for contentment； on the contrary； he reckoned the most
disinterested practice of good amongst the ways of enjoying the most
intimate delight； and his scheme of pleasure （by which he meant
constant cheerfulness of mind） included the moderation and control
of the inclinations； such as the strictest moral philosopher might
require。 He differed from the Stoics chiefly in making this pleasure
the motive； which they very rightly refused to do。 For； on the one
hand； the virtuous Epicurus； like many well…intentioned men of this
day who do not reflect deeply enough on their principles； fell into
the error of presupposing the virtuous disposition in the persons
for whom he wished to provide the springs to virtue （and indeed the
upright man cannot be happy if he is not first conscious of his
uprightness； since with such a character the reproach that his habit
of thought would oblige him to make against himself in case of
transgression and his moral self…condemnation would rob him of all
enjoyment of the pleasantness which his condition might otherwise
contain）。 But the question is： How is such a disposition possible in
the first instance； and such a habit of thought in estimating the
worth of one's existence； since prior to it there can be in the
subject no feeling at all for moral worth？ If a man is virtuous
without being conscious of his integrity in every action； he will
certainly not enjoy life； however favourable fortune may be to him
in its physical circumstances； but can we make him virtuous in the
first instance； in other words； before he esteems the moral worth of
his existence so highly； by praising to him the peace of mind that
would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has
no sense？
On the other hand； however； there is here an occasion of a vitium
subreptionis； and as it were of an optical illusion； in the
self…consciousness of what one does as distinguished from what one
feels… an illusion which even the most experienced cannot altogether
avoid。 The moral disposition of mind is necessarily bined with a
consciousness that the will is determined directly by the law。 Now the
consciousness of a determination of the faculty of desire is always
the source of a satisfaction in the resulting action； but this
pleasure； this satisfaction in oneself； is not the determining
principle of the action； on the contrary； the determination of the
will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure；
and this remains a pure practical not sensible determination of the
faculty of desire。 Now as this determination has exactly the same
effect within in impelling to activity； that a feeling of the pleasure
to be expected from the