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perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God； hence the highest
degree of certainty to which this pre…supposition can be brought is
that it is the most rational opinion for us men。* On the other hand； a
requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty； that of
making something （the summum bonum） the object of my will so as to
promote it with all my powers； in which case I must suppose its
possibility and； consequently； also the conditions necessary
thereto； namely； God； freedom； and immortality； since I cannot prove
these by my speculative reason； although neither can I refute them。
This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent
of these suppositions and is of itself apodeictically certain； namely；
the moral law； and so far it needs no further support by theoretical
views as to the inner constitution of things； the secret final aim
of the order of the world； or a presiding ruler thereof； in order to
bind me in the most perfect manner to act in unconditional
conformity to the law。 But the subjective effect of this law；
namely； the mental disposition conformed to it and made necessary by
it； to promote the practically possible summum bonum； this
pre…supposes at least that the latter is possible； for it would be
practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception
which at bottom was empty and had no object。 Now the above…mentioned
postulates concern only the physical or metaphysical conditions of the
possibility of the summum bonum； in a word； those which lie in the
nature of things； not； however； for the sake of an arbitrary
speculative purpose； but of a practically necessary end of a pure
rational will； which in this case does not choose； but obeys an
inexorable mand of reason； the foundation of which is objective； in
the constitution of things as they must be universally judged by
pure reason； and is not based on inclination； for we are in nowise
justified in assuming； on account of what we wish on merely subjective
grounds； that the means thereto are possible or that its object is
real。 This； then； is an absolutely necessary requirement； and what
it pre…supposes is not merely justified as an allowable hypothesis；
but as a postulate in a practical point of view； and admitting that
the pure moral law inexorably binds every man as a mand （not as a
rule of prudence）； the righteous man may say： 〃I will that there be
a God； that my existence in this world be also an existence outside
the chain of physical causes and in a pure world of the understanding；
and lastly； that my duration be endless； I firmly abide by this； and
will not let this faith be taken from me； for in this instance alone
my interest； because I must not relax anything of it； inevitably
determines my judgement； without regarding sophistries； however unable
I may be to answer them or to oppose them with others more
plausible。*＇2＇
*But even here we should not be able to allege a requirement of
reason； if we had not before our eyes a problematical； but yet
inevitable； conception of reason； namely； that of an absolutely
necessary being。 This conception now seeks to be defined； and this； in
addition to the tendency to extend itself； is the objective ground
of a requirement of speculative reason； namely； to have a more precise
definition of the conception of a necessary being which is to serve as
the first cause of other beings； so as to make these latter knowable
by some means。 Without such antecedent necessary problems there are no
requirements… at least not of pure reason… the rest are requirements
of inclination。
*＇2＇ In the Deutsches Museum； February； 1787； there is a
dissertation by a very subtle and clear…headed man； the late
Wizenmann； whose early death is to be lamented； in which he disputes
the right to argue from a want to the objective reality of its object；
and illustrates the point by the example of a man in love； who
having fooled himself into an idea of beauty； which is merely a
chimera of his own brain； would fain conclude that such an object
really exists somewhere。 I quite agree with him in this； in all
cases where the want is founded on inclination； which cannot
necessarily postulate the existence of its object even for the man
that is affected by it； much less can it contain a demand valid for
everyone； and therefore it is merely a subjective ground of the
wish。 But in the present case we have a want of reason springing
from an objective determining principle of the will； namely； the moral
law； which necessarily binds every rational being； and therefore
justifies him in assuming a priori in nature the conditions proper for
it； and makes the latter inseparable from the plete practical use
of reason。 It is a duty to realize the summum bonum to the utmost of
our power； therefore it must be possible； consequently it is
unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is
necessary for its objective possibility。 The assumption is as
necessary as the moral law； in connection with which alone it is
valid。
In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion as yet so
unusual as that of a faith of pure practical reason； let me be
permitted to add one more remark。 It might almost seem as if this
rational faith were here announced as itself a mand； namely； that
we should assume the summum bonum as possible。 But a faith that is
manded is nonsense。 Let the preceding analysis； however； be
remembered of what is required to be supposed in the conception of the
summum bonum； and it will be seen that it cannot be manded to
assume this possibility； and no practical disposition of mind is
required to admit it； but that speculative reason must concede it
without being asked； for no one can affirm that it is impossible in
itself that rational beings in the world should at the same time be
worthy of happiness in conformity with the moral law and also
possess this happiness proportionately。 Now in respect of the first
element of the summum bonum； namely； that which concerns morality； the
moral law gives merely a mand； and to doubt the possibility of that
element would be the same as to call in question the mor