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esteem for it is much weakened by the notion of duty to himself
which seems in this case to be somewhat infringed。 More decisive is
the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the safety of one's country； and
yet there still remains some scruple whether it is a perfect duty to
devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously and unbidden； and
the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern and impulse
to imitation。 But if an indispensable duty be in question； the
transgression of which violates the moral law itself； and without
regard to the welfare of mankind； and as it were tramples on its
holiness （such as are usually called duties to God； because in Him
we conceive the ideal of holiness in substance）； then we give our most
perfect esteem to the pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can
have any value for the dearest inclinations； and we find our soul
strengthened and elevated by such an example； when we convince
ourselves by contemplation of it that human nature is capable of so
great an elevation above every motive that nature can oppose to it。
Juvenal describes such an example in a climax which makes the reader
feel vividly the force of the spring that is contained in the pure law
of duty； as duty：
Esto bonus miles； tutor bonus； arbiter idem
Integer； ambiguae si quando citabere testis
Incertaeque rei； Phalaris licet imperet ut sis
Falsus； et admoto dictet periuria tauro；
Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori；
Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas。*
*＇Juvenal； Satirae； 〃Be you a good soldier； a faithful tutor； an
uncorrupted umpire also； if you are summoned as a witness in a
doubtful and uncertain thing； though Phalaris should mand that
you should be false； and should dictate perjuries with the bull
brought to you； believe it the highest impiety to prefer life to
reputation； and for the sake of life； to lose the causes of living。〃＇
When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action；
then the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self…love and has
therefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility。 But to
postpone everything to the holiness of duty alone； and to be conscious
that we can because our own reason recognises this as its mand
and says that we ought to do it； this is； as it were； to raise
ourselves altogether above the world of sense； and there is
inseparably involved in the same a consciousness of the law； as a
spring of a faculty that controls the sensibility； and although this
is not always attended with effect； yet frequent engagement with
this spring； and the at first minor attempts at using it； give hope
that this effect may be wrought； and that by degrees the greatest； and
that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in us。
The method then takes the following course。 At first we are only
concerned to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural
employment acpanying all our own free actions； as well as the
observation of those of others； and to make it as it were a habit； and
to sharpen this judgement； asking first whether the action conforms
objectively to the moral law； and to what law； and we distinguish
the law that merely furnishes a principle of obligation from that
which is really obligatory （leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus）；
as； for instance； the law of what men's wants require from me； as
contrasted with that which their rights demand； the latter of which
prescribes essential； the former only non…essential duties； and thus
we teach how to distinguish different kinds of duties which meet in
the same action。 The other point to which attention must be directed
is the question whether the action was also （subjectively） done for
the sake of the moral law； so that it not only is morally correct as a
deed； but also； by the maxim from which it is done； has moral worth as
a disposition。 Now there is no doubt that this practice； and the
resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the practical；
must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of reason；
and consequently in morally good actions。 For we ultimately take a
liking for a thing； the contemplation of which makes us feel that
the use of our cognitive faculties is extended； and this extension
is especially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness；
since it is only in such an order of things that reason； with its
faculty of determining a priori on principle what ought to be done；
can find satisfaction。 An observer of nature takes liking at last to
objects that at first offended his senses； when he discovers in them
the great adaptation of their organization to design； so that his
reason finds food in its contemplation。 So Leibnitz spared an insect
that he had carefully examined with the microscope； and replaced it on
its leaf； because he had found himself instructed by the view of it
and had； as it were； received a benefit from it。
But this employment of the faculty of judgement； which makes us feel
our own cognitive powers； is not yet the interest in actions and in
their morality itself。 It merely causes us to take pleasure in
engaging in such criticism； and it gives to virtue or the
disposition that conforms to moral laws a form of beauty； which is
admired； but not on that account sought after （laudatur et alget）；
as everything the contemplation of which produces a consciousness of
the harmony of our powers of conception； and in which we feel the
whole of our faculty of knowledge （understanding and imagination）
strengthened； produces a satisfaction； which may also be
municated to others； while nevertheless the existence of the object
remains indifferent to us； being only regarded as the occasion of
our being aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above
mere animal nature。 Now； however； the second exercise es in； the
living exhibition of morality of character by examples； in which
attention is directed to purity of will； first only as a negative
perfection； in so far as in an action done from duty no motives of
inclination have any influence in determining it。 By this the
pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of