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All practical principles which presuppose an object （matter） of
the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are
empirical and can furnish no practical laws。
By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the
realization of which is desired。 Now； if the desire for this object
precedes the practical rule and is the condition of our making it a
principle； then I say （in the first place） this principle is in that
case wholly empirical； for then what determines the choice is the idea
of an object and that relation of this idea to the subject by which
its faculty of desire is determined to its realization。 Such a
relation to the subject is called the pleasure in the realization of
an object。 This； then； must be presupposed as a condition of the
possibility of determination of the will。 But it is impossible to know
a priori of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with
pleasure or pain； or be indifferent。 In such cases； therefore； the
determining principle of the choice must be empirical and；
therefore； also the practical material principle which presupposes
it as a condition。
In the second place； since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain
can be known only empirically and cannot hold in the same degree for
all rational beings； a principle which is based on this subjective
condition may serve indeed as a maxim for the subject which
possesses this susceptibility； but not as a law even to him （because
it is wanting in objective necessity； which must be recognized a
priori）； it follows； therefore； that such a principle can never
furnish a practical law。
III。 THEOREM II。
All material practical principles as such are of one and the same
kind and e under the general principle of self…love or private
happiness。
Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a
thing； in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing； is
founded on the susceptibility of the subject； since it depends on
the presence of an object； hence it belongs to sense （feeling）； and
not to understanding； which expresses a relation of the idea to an
object according to concepts； not to the subject according to
feelings。 It is； then； practical only in so far as the faculty of
desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the
subject expects from the actual existence of the object。 Now； a
rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life
uninterruptedly acpanying his whole existence is happiness； and the
principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of
the will is the principle of self…love。 All material principles； then；
which place the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain
to be received from the existence of any object are all of the same
kind； inasmuch as they all belong to the principle of self…love or
private happiness。
COROLLARY。
All material practical rules place the determining principle of
the will in the lower desires； and if there were no purely formal laws
of the will adequate to determine it； then we could not admit any
higher desire at all。
REMARK I。
It is surprising that men； otherwise acute； can think it possible to
distinguish between higher and lower desires； according as the ideas
which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin
in the senses or in the understanding； for when we inquire what are
the determining grounds of desire； and place them in some expected
pleasantness； it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing
object is derived； but only how much it pleases。 Whether an idea has
its seat and source in the understanding or not； if it can only
determine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the
subject； it follows that its capability of determining the choice
depends altogether on the nature of the inner sense； namely； that this
can be agreeably affected by it。 However dissimilar ideas of objects
may be； though they be ideas of the understanding； or even of the
reason in contrast to ideas of sense； yet the feeling of pleasure；
by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the
will （the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the
production of the object）； is of one and the same kind； not only
inasmuch as it can only be known empirically； but also inasmuch as
it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in
the faculty of desire； and in this respect can only differ in degree
from every other ground of determination。 Otherwise； how could we
pare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination； the
ideas of which depend upon different faculties； so as to prefer that
which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree。 The same
man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again
obtain； in order not to miss a hunt； he may depart in the midst of a
fine speech； in order not to be late for dinner； he may leave a
rational conversation； such as he otherwise values highly； to take his
place at the gaming…table； he may even repulse a poor man whom he at
other times takes pleasure in benefiting； because he has only just
enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theatre。 If
the determination of his will rests on the feeling of the
agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause； it
is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected。
The only thing that concerns him； in order to decide his choice； is；
how great； how long continued； how easily obtained； and how often
repeated； this agreeableness is。 just as to the man who wants money to
spend； it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain
or washed out of the sand； provided it is everywhere accepted at the
same value； so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does
not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses；
but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the
longest time。 It is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason
the power of determining the will； without the presupposi