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reality； but not the less it has a real application； which is
exhibited in concreto in intentions or maxims； that is； it has a
practical reality which can be specified； and this is sufficient to
justify it even with a view to noumena。
Now； this objective reality of a pure concept of the understanding
in the sphere of the supersensible； once brought in； gives an
objective reality also to all the other categories； although only so
far as they stand in necessary connexion with the determining
principle of the will （the moral law）； a reality only of practical
application； which has not the least effect in enlarging our
theoretical knowledge of these objects； or the discernment of their
nature by pure reason。 So we shall find also in the sequel that
these categories refer only to beings as intelligences； and in them
only to the relation of reason to the will； consequently； always
only to the practical； and beyond this cannot pretend to any knowledge
of these beings； and whatever other properties belonging to the
theoretical representation of supersensible things may be brought into
connexion with these categories； this is not to be reckoned as
knowledge； but only as a right （in a practical point of view； however；
it is a necessity） to admit and assume such beings； even in the case
where we ＇conceive＇ supersensible beings （e。g。； God） according to
analogy； that is； a purely rational relation； of which we make a
practical use with reference to what is sensible； and thus the
application to the supersensible solely in a practical point of view
does not give pure theoretic reason the least encouragement to run
riot into the transcendent。
CHAPTER II。 Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason。
By a concept of the practical reason I understand the idea of an
object as an effect possible to be produced through freedom。 To be
an object of practical knowledge； as such； signifies； therefore；
only the relation of the will to the action by which the object or its
opposite would be realized； and to decide whether something is an
object of pure practical reason or not is only to discern the
possibility or impossibility of willing the action by which； if we had
the required power （about which experience must decide）； a certain
object would be realized。 If the object be taken as the determining
principle of our desire； it must first be known whether it is
physically possible by the free use of our powers； before we decide
whether it is an object of practical reason or not。 On the other hand；
if the law can be considered a priori as the determining principle
of the action； and the latter therefore as determined by pure
practical reason； the judgement whether a thing is an object of pure
practical reason or not does not depend at all on the parison
with our physical power； and the question is only whether we should
will an action that is directed to the existence of an object； if
the object were in our power； hence the previous question is only as
the moral possibility of the action； for in this case it is not the
object； but the law of the will； that is the determining principle
of the action。 The only objects of practical reason are therefore
those of good and evil。 For by the former is meant an object
necessarily desired according to a principle of reason； by the
latter one necessarily shunned； also according to a principle of
reason。
If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent
practical law； but； on the contrary； is to serve as its foundation； it
can only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure；
and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it； that
is to say； determines the faculty of desire。 Now； since it is
impossible to discern a priori what idea will be acpanied with
pleasure and what with pain； it will depend on experience alone to
find out what is primarily good or evil。 The property of the
subject； with reference to which alone this experiment can be made； is
the feeling of pleasure and pain； a receptivity belonging to the
internal sense； thus that only would be primarily good with which
the sensation of pleasure is immediately connected； and that simply
evil which immediately excites pain。 Since； however； this is opposed
even to the usage of language； which distinguishes the pleasant from
the good； the unpleasant from the evil； and requires that good and
evil shall always be judged by reason； and； therefore； by concepts
which can be municated to everyone； and not by mere sensation；
which is limited to individual ＇subjects＇ and their susceptibility；
and； since nevertheless； pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any
idea of an object a priori； the philosopher who thought himself
obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his
practical judgements would call that good which is a means to the
pleasant； and evil； what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain； for
the judgement on the relation of means to ends certainly belongs to
reason。 But； although reason is alone capable of discerning the
connexion of means with their ends （so that the will might even be
defined as the faculty of ends； since these are always determining
principles of the desires）； yet the practical maxims which would
follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a
means； would never contain as the object of the will anything good
in itself； but only something good for something； the good would
always be merely the useful； and that for which it is useful must
always lie outside the will； in sensation。 Now if this as a pleasant
sensation were to be distinguished from the notion of good； then there
would be nothing primarily good at all； but the good would have to
be sought only in the means to something else； namely； some
pleasantness。
It is an old formula of the schools： Nihil appetimus nisi sub
ratione boni； Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali； and it is used
often correctly； but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy；
because the expressions boni and mali are ambiguous； owing to the
poverty of language； in consequence of which they admit a double
sense； and； therefore