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by the moral law。
I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table；
since it is intelligible enough of itself。 A division of this kind
based on principles is very useful in any science； both for the sake
of thoroughness and intelligibility。 Thus； for instance； we know
from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin
from in practical inquiries； namely； from the maxims which every one
founds on his own inclinations； the precepts which hold for a
species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain
inclinations； and finally the law which holds for all without regard
to their inclinations； etc。 In this way we survey the whole plan of
what has to be done； every question of practical philosophy that has
to be answered； and also the order that is to be followed。
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement。
It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of
the will。 They themselves； however； are subject to a practical rule of
reason which； if it is pure reason； determines the will a priori
relatively to its object。 Now； whether an action which is possible
to us in the world of sense； es under the rule or not； is a
question to be decided by the practical judgement； by which what is
said in the rule universally （in abstracto） is applied to an action in
concreto。 But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place
as practical concerns the existence of an object； and in the second
place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as
regards the existence of the action and； therefore； is a practical
law； not a physical law depending on empirical principles of
determination； but a law of freedom by which the will is to be
determined independently on anything empirical （merely by the
conception of a law and its form）； whereas all instances that can
occur of possible actions can only be empirical； that is； belong to
the experience of physical nature； hence； it seems absurd to expect to
find in the world of sense a case which； while as such it depends only
on the law of nature； yet admits of the application to it of a law
of freedom； and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the
morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto。 Thus； the
judgement of the pure practical reason is subject to the same
difficulties as that of the pure theoretical reason。 The latter；
however； had means at hand of escaping from these difficulties；
because； in regard to the theoretical employment； intuitions were
required to which pure concepts of the understanding could be applied；
and such intuitions （though only of objects of the senses） can be
given a priori and； therefore； as far as regards the union of the
manifold in them； conforming to the pure a priori concepts of the
understanding as schemata。 On the other hand； the morally good is
something whose object is supersensible； for which； therefore； nothing
corresponding can be found in any sensible intuition。 Judgement
depending on laws of pure practical reason seems； therefore； to be
subject to special difficulties arising from this； that a law of
freedom is to be applied to actions； which are events taking place
in the world of sense； and which； so far； belong to physical nature。
But here again is opened a favourable prospect for the pure
practical judgement。 When I subsume under a pure practical law an
action possible to me in the world of sense； I am not concerned with
the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense。
This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its
theoretic use according to the law of causality； which is a pure
concept of the understanding； for which reason has a schema in the
sensible intuition。 Physical causality； or the condition under which
it takes place； belongs to the physical concepts； the schema of
which is sketched by transcendental imagination。 Here； however； we
have to do； not with the schema of a case that occurs according to
laws； but with the schema of a law itself （if the word is allowable
here）； since the fact that the will （not the action relatively to
its effect） is determined by the law alone without any other
principle； connects the notion of causality with quite different
conditions from those which constitute physical connection。
The physical law being a law to which the objects of sensible
intuition； as such； are subject； must have a schema corresponding to
it… that is； a general procedure of the imagination （by which it
exhibits a priori to the senses the pure concept of the
understanding which the law determines）。 But the law of freedom
（that is； of a causality not subject to sensible conditions）； and
consequently the concept of the unconditionally good； cannot have
any intuition； nor consequently any schema supplied to it for the
purpose of its application in concreto。 Consequently the moral law has
no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical
objects （not the imagination）； and the understanding for the
purposes of the judgement can provide for an idea of the reason； not a
schema of the sensibility； but a law； though only as to its form as
law； such a law； however； as can be exhibited in concreto in objects
of the senses； and therefore a law of nature。 We can therefore call
this law the type of the moral law。
The rule of the judgement according to laws of pure practical reason
is this： ask yourself whether； if the action you propose were to
take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself
a part； you could regard it as possible by your own will。 Everyone
does； in fact； decide by this rule whether actions are morally good or
evil。 Thus； people say： 〃If everyone permitted himself to deceive；
when he thought it to his advantage； or thought himself justified in
shortening his life as soon as he was thoroughly weary of it； or
looked with perfect indifference on the necessity of others； and if
you belonged to such an order of things； would you do so with the
assent of your own will？〃 Now everyone knows well that if he
secretly allows himself to deceive； it does not follow that everyone
else does s