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secretly allows himself to deceive； it does not follow that everyone
else does so； or if； unobserved； he is destitute of passion； others
would not necessarily be so to him； hence； this parison of the
maxim of his actions with a universal law of nature is not the
determining principle of his will。 Such a law is； nevertheless； a type
of the estimation of the maxim on moral principles。 If the maxim of
the action is not such as to stand the test of the form of a universal
law of nature； then it is morally impossible。 This is the judgement
even of mon sense； for its ordinary judgements； even those of
experience； are always based on the law of nature。 It has it therefore
always at hand； only that in cases where causality from freedom is
to be criticised； it makes that law of nature only the type of a law
of freedom； because； without something which it could use as an
example in a case of experience； it could not give the law of a pure
practical reason its proper use in practice。
It is therefore allowable to use the system of the world of sense as
the type of a supersensible system of things； provided I do not
transfer to the latter the intuitions； and what depends on them； but
merely apply to it the form of law in general （the notion of which
occurs even in the monest use of reason； but cannot be definitely
known a priori for any other purpose than the pure practical use of
reason）； for laws； as such； are so far identical； no matter from
what they derive their determining principles。
Further； since of all the supersensible absolutely nothing ＇is
known＇ except freedom （through the moral law）； and this only so far as
it is inseparably implied in that law； and moreover all
supersensible objects to which reason might lead us； following the
guidance of that law； have still no reality for us； except for the
purpose of that law； and for the use of mere practical reason； and
as reason is authorized and even pelled to use physical nature
（in its pure form as an object of the understanding） as the type of
the judgement； hence； the present remark will serve to guard against
reckoning amongst concepts themselves that which belongs only to the
typic of concepts。 This； namely； as a typic of the judgement； guards
against the empiricism of practical reason； which founds the practical
notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences （so…called
happiness）。 No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would
result from a will determined by self…love； if this will at the same
time erected itself into a universal law of nature； may certainly
serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good； but it is
not identical with it。 The same typic guards also against the
mysticism of practical reason； which turns what served only as a
symbol into a schema； that is； proposes to provide for the moral
concepts actual intuitions； which； however； are not sensible
（intuitions of an invisible Kingdom of God）； and thus plunges into the
transcendent。 What is befitting the use of the moral concepts is
only the rationalism of the judgement； which takes from the sensible
system of nature only what pure reason can also conceive of itself；
that is； conformity to law； and transfers into the supersensible
nothing but what can conversely be actually exhibited by actions in
the world of sense according to the formal rule of a law of nature。
However； the caution against empiricism of practical reason is much
more important； for mysticism is quite reconcilable with the purity
and sublimity of the moral law； and； besides； it is not very natural
or agreeable to mon habits of thought to strain one's imagination
to supersensible intuitions； and hence the danger on this side is
not so general。 Empiricism； on the contrary； cuts up at the roots
the morality of intentions （in which； and not in actions only；
consists the high worth that men can and ought to give to themselves）；
and substitutes for duty something quite different； namely； an
empirical interest； with which the inclinations generally are secretly
leagued； and empiricism； moreover； being on this account allied with
all the inclinations which （no matter what fashion they put on）
degrade humanity when they are raised to the dignity of a supreme
practical principle； and as these； nevertheless； are so favourable
to everyone's feelings； it is for that reason much more dangerous than
mysticism； which can never constitute a lasting condition of any great
number of persons。
CHAPTER III。 Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason。
What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral
law should directly determine the will。 If the determination of the
will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law； but only by
means of a feeling； no matter of what kind； which has to be
presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the
will； and therefore not for the sake of the law； then the action
will possess legality； but not morality。 Now； if we understand by
motive （elater animi） the subjective ground of determination of the
will of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the
objective law； by virtue of its own nature； then it will follow；
first； that not motives can be attributed to the Divine will； and that
the motives of the human will （as well as that of every created
rational being） can never be anything else than the moral law； and
consequently that the objective principle of determination must always
and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of
the action； if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law；
without containing its spirit。*
*We may say of every action that conforms to the law； but is not
done for the sake of the law； that it is morally good in the letter；
not in the spirit （the intention）。
Since； then； for the purpose of giving the moral law influence
over the will； we must not seek for any other motives that might
enable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself； because
that would produce mere hypocrisy； without consistency； and it is even
dangerous to allow other motives （for instance； that of interest） even