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look for a category for the rational idea of freedom with which I am
now concerned； and this is the category of causality； and although
freedom； a concept of the reason； being a transcendent concept； cannot
have any intuition corresponding to it； yet the concept of the
understanding… for the synthesis of which the former demands the
unconditioned… （namely； the concept of causality） must have a sensible
intuition given； by which first its objective reality is assured。 Now；
the categories are all divided into two classes… the mathematical；
which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects； and
the dynamical； which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception
of the existence of objects。 The former （those of magnitude and
quality） always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous； and it is
not possible to find in this the unconditioned antecedent to what is
given in sensible intuition as conditioned in space and time； as
this would itself have to belong to space and time； and therefore be
again still conditioned。 Whence it resulted in the Dialectic of Pure
Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of attaining the
unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both wrong。
The categories of the second class （those of causality and of the
necessity of a thing） did not require this homogeneity （of the
conditioned and the condition in synthesis）； since here what we have
to explain is not how the intuition is pounded from a manifold in
it； but only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding
to it is added to the existence of the condition （added； namely； in
the understanding as connected therewith）； and in that case it was
allowable to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned
antecedent to the altogether conditioned in the world of sense （both
as regards the causal connection and the contingent existence of
things themselves）； although this unconditioned remained
indeterminate； and to make the synthesis transcendent。 Hence； it was
found in the Dialectic of the Pure Speculative Reason that the two
apparently opposite methods of obtaining for the conditioned the
unconditioned were not really contradictory； e。g。； in the synthesis of
causality to conceive for the conditioned in the series of causes
and effects of the sensible world； a causality which has no sensible
condition； and that the same action which； as belonging to the world
of sense； is always sensibly conditioned； that is； mechanically
necessary； yet at the same time may be derived from a causality not
sensibly conditioned… being the causality of the acting being as
belonging to the supersensible world… and may consequently be
conceived as free。 Now； the only point in question was to change
this may be into is； that is； that we should be able to show in an
actual case； as it were by a fact； that certain actions imply such a
causality （namely； the intellectual； sensibly unconditioned）；
whether they are actual or only manded； that is； objectively
necessary in a practical sense。 We could not hope to find this
connections in actions actually given in experience as events of the
sensible world； since causality with freedom must always be sought
outside the world of sense in the world of intelligence。 But things of
sense of sense in the world of intelligence。 But things of sense are
the only things offered to our perception and observation。 Hence；
nothing remained but to find an incontestable objective principle of
causality which excludes all sensible conditions： that is； a principle
in which reason does not appeal further to something else as a
determining ground of its causality； but contains this determining
ground itself by means of that principle； and in which therefore it is
itself as pure reason practical。 Now； this principle had not to be
searched for or discovered； it had long been in the reason of all men；
and incorporated in their nature； and is the principle of morality。
Therefore； that unconditioned causality； with the faculty of it；
namely； freedom； is no longer merely indefinitely and
problematically thought （this speculative reason could prove to be
feasible）； but is even as regards the law of its causality
definitely and assertorially known； and with it the fact that a
being （I myself）； belonging to the world of sense； belongs also to the
supersensible world； this is also positively known； and thus the
reality of the supersensible world is established and in practical
respects definitely given； and this definiteness； which for
theoretical purposes would be transcendent； is for practical
purposes immanent。 We could not； however； make a similar step as
regards the second dynamical idea； namely； that of a necessary
being。 We could not rise to it from the sensible world without the aid
of the first dynamical idea。 For if we attempted to do so； we should
have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us； and to leap
to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect the
connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense
（since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside
ourselves）。 On the other hand； it is now obvious that this
connection is quite possible in relation to our own subject；
inasmuch as I know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible
＇supersensible＇ being determined by the moral law （by means of
freedom）； and on the other side as acting in the world of sense。 It is
the concept of freedom alone that enables us to find the unconditioned
and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going out of
ourselves。 For it is our own reason that by means of the supreme and
unconditional practical law knows that itself and the being that is
conscious of this law （our own person） belong to the pure world of
understanding； and moreover defines the manner in which； as such； it
can be active。 In this way it can be understood why in the whole
faculty of reason it is the practical reason only that can help us
to pass beyond the world of sense and give us knowledge of a
supersensible order and connection； which； however； for this very
reason cannot be extended further