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conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue〃； the Stoic
said： 〃To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness。〃 With the former；
Prudence was equivalent to morality； with the latter； who chose a
higher designation for virtue； morality alone was true wisdom。
While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all
imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy； we must at
the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied
in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous
notions； those of happiness and virtue。 But it agrees with the
dialectical spirit of their times （and subtle minds are even now
sometimes misled in the same way） to get rid of irreconcilable
differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest
about words； and thus apparently working out the identity of the
notion under different names； and this usually occurs in cases where
the bination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high；
or would require so plete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
in the rest of the philosophical system； that men are afraid to
penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as
a difference in questions of form。
While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness； they were not agreed as to the way
in which they tried to force this identity； but were separated
infinitely from one another； the one placing its principle on the side
of sense； the other on that of reason； the one in the consciousness of
sensible wants； the other in the independence of practical reason on
all sensible grounds of determination。 According to the Epicurean； the
notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim： 〃To promote
one's own happiness〃； according to the Stoics； on the other hand；
the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of
virtue。 Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical
with part of the containing notion； but not with the whole； and
moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct； although they
consist of the same parts； namely if the parts are united into a whole
in totally different ways。 The Stoic maintained that the virtue was
the whole summum bonum； and happiness only the consciousness of
possessing it； as making part of the state of the subject。 The
Epicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum； and
virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit； viz。； the
rational use of the means for attaining it。
Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and
those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme
practical principle； and； although they belong to one summum bonum
which together they make possible； yet they are so far from coinciding
that they restrict and check one another very much in the same
subject。 Thus the question： 〃How is the summum bonum practically
possible？〃 still remains an unsolved problem； notwithstanding all
the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made。 The Analytic
has； however； shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to
solve； namely； that happiness and morality are two specifically
distinct elements of the summum bonum and； therefore； their
bination cannot be analytically cognised （as if the man that
seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception
that in so acting he is virtuous； or as if the man that follows virtue
should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already
happy ipso facto）； but must be a synthesis of concepts。 Now since this
bination is recognised as a priori； and therefore as practically
necessary； and consequently not as derived from experience； so that
the possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical
principle； it follows that the deduction ＇legitimation＇ of this
concept must be transcendental。 It is a priori （morally） necessary
to produce the summum bonum by freedom of will： therefore the
condition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles
of cognition。
I。 The Antinomy of Practical Reason。
In the summum bonum which is practical for us； i。e。； to be
realized by our will； virtue and happiness are thought as
necessarily bined； so that the one cannot be assumed by pure
practical reason without the other also being attached to it。 Now this
bination （like every other） is either analytical or synthetical。 It
bas been shown that it cannot be analytical； it must then be
synthetical and； more particularly； must be conceived as the
connection of cause and effect； since it concerns a practical good；
i。e。； one that is possible by means of action； consequently either the
desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue； or the
maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness。 The first is
absolutely impossible； because （as was proved in the Analytic）
maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire
of personal happiness are not moral at all； and no virtue can be
founded on them。 But the second is also impossible； because the
practical connection of causes and effects in the world； as the result
of the determination of the will； does not depend upon the moral
dispositions of the will； but on the knowledge of the laws of nature
and the physical power to use them for one's purposes； consequently we
cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the
moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue
adequate to the summum bonum。 Now； as the promotion of this summum
bonum； the conception of which contains this connection； is a priori a
necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral
law； the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the
latter。 If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules；
then the moral law also which mands us to promote it is directed to
vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false。
II。 Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason。
The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar
conflict between freed